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I. INTRODUCTION
A. Science: Cure or Curse?
Improvements in scientific technology have allowed modem medi-
cine to treat and cure some of the most painful and life-threatening
illnesses, including polio, tuberculosis, and HIV. In many parts of the
world, life expectancy has increased' while mortality rates have de-
creased2, which is largely the result of greater scientific awareness in
combination with the creation of life-saving procedures and devices.
The potential exists for technology to continue to advance in ways that
improve quality of life. Technological advancement in the study of sci-
ence allows people to make lifestyle decisions that contribute to good (or
better) health outcomes. For example, people may make informed deci-
sions regarding exercise, smoking, what types of food to eat, and even
when to have children. Further, most civilizations have learned the im-
portance of basic sanitation such as hand-washing,3 waste disposal or
burial , and clean water
1. See WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION (WHO], WORLD HEALTH STATISTICS 2007 12
(2007).
2. Id. at 10, 12 (indicating that mortality rates for almost all communicable diseases
have decreased).
3. See WHO, Water Sanitation, and Hygiene Links to Health: Facts and Figures-
Updated November 2004 (2004), available at http://www.who.int/watersanitationhealth/
publications/facts2004/en/print.html (last visited June 26, 2007).
4. See, e.g., Juliet Waterkeyn & Sandy Cairncross, Creating a Demand for Sanitation
and Hygiene through Community Health Clubs: A Cost Effective Intervention in Two Districts
in Zimbabwe, 61 Soc. ScI. & MEDICINE 1958, 1963-65 (2005); see also U.N. Econ. & Soc.
Council [ECOSOC], Comm. on Econ. & Soc. Rights, Substantive Issues Arising in the Im-
plementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights:
General Comment 15 on the Right to Water, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2002/11 (Nov. 26, 2002);
WHO/UNICEF, JOINT MONITORING PROGRAMME FOR WATER SUPPLY AND SANITATION,
GLOBAL WATER SUPPLY AND SANITATION ASSESSMENT 2000 REPORT (2000); John Scanlon,
Angela Cassar & No6mi Nemes, Environmental & Law Policy Paper No. 51: Water as a Hu-
man Right?, in INTERNATIONAL UNION FOR CONSERVATION OF NATURE AND NATURAL
RESOURCES 13-25 (2004).
5. See, e.g., Bill Wallin, Cheikh Gaye, Laurence Gourcy & Pradeep Aggarwal, Isotope
Methods for Management of Shared Aquifers in Northern Africa, 43 GROUND WATER 744
(2005); see also Thalif Deen, Development-Africa: Water Water Everywhere .... GLOBAL
INFO. NETWORK, Aug. 24, 2005, at 1; Sandra L. Postel & Aaron T. Wolf, Dehydrating Con-
flict, FOREIGN POL'Y, Sept.-Oct. 2001, at 60-67. Further efforts have been and are being made
to continue wide scale education efforts in poorer and more remote areas as well as regions in
conflict. Additional attempts to engage in outreach by providing necessary materials such as
soap, latrines, water, and water purification tablets are in progress to ensure that the millen-
nium development goals are achieved. See Millennium Development Goals as stated in
Millennium Declaration, G.A. Res. 55/2, 19, 23, U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess., Supp. No. 49 at
4, U.N. Doc. A/55/49 (Sept. 8, 2000); see also Juliet Waterkeyn & Sandy Cairncross, supra
note 4; S.A. Esrey et a]., Effects of Improved Water Supply and Sanitation on Ascariasis, Diar-
rhoea, Dracunculiasis, Hookworm Infection, Schistosomiasis, and Trachoma, 69 BULL.
WORLD HEALTH ORG. 609-21 (1991).
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Access to general education and healthcare may also be improved
through the creation of vehicles and roads which enhance the distribu-
tion of educative materials and improve the availability of doctors and
medical staff. Better communication devices may also provide for better
information dissemination systems so that people can gain better access
to basic medical and safety information, and so that during an epidemic,
vital information can be delivered more rapidly.6 Technology could also
assist in achieving universal healthcare coverage by not only making
medications and treatments available, but also by making them afford-
able
Technology may also be used to enhance international monitoring
through the creation, improvement, and use of more advanced transpar-
ency mechanisms.8 Communications devices such as telephones and
computers may allow for better record-keeping.9 In turn, better record-
keeping may assist in ensuring that both healthcare needs and human
rights conditions are satisfied.' Additionally, some discussion has
touched on the possibility of utilizing Internet and satellite technology to
monitor volatile areas early on during periods of conflict." The satellite
images could indicate whether villages were being wiped out, people
being forced to migrate, barricades being erected, water supplies being
impacted, or homes being destroyed.'
The human rights benefits of technology are fairly obvious. In the
most brilliant and extreme cases, technology could provide for universal
healthcare, universal education, and international protection against
genocide. However, the potential of science is duplicitous in nature as
this power to enhance life could easily be converted into a power to de-
stroy life. Thus, recent advancements in medicine and technology may
be creating a loophole for violations of human rights. In fact, one might
wonder if science is advancing so quickly that it has surpassed human
6. See Jamie F. Metzl, Information Technology and Human Rights, 18 HUM. RTs. Q.
705,721-22 (1996).
7. See, e.g., WHO, supra note 1, at 15-19.
8. See, e.g., Metzl, supra note 6, at 706 (noting the presence and role in more recent
conflicts of the media in facilitating international awareness of serious conflicts); see gener-
ally Steven D. Jamar, The Human Right of Access to Legal Information: Using Technology to
Advance Transparency and the Rule of Law, GLOBAL JURIST Topics, Vol. 1, Iss. 2, No. 6
(2001), http://www.bepress.com/gjtopics/vol 1/iss2/art6.
9. See Metzl, supra note 6, at 727, 734-38; see also Jamar, supra note 8, at 4-5 (dis-
cussing benefits of online availability and access to national domestic laws).
10. See WHO, supra note I, at 10.
11. See, e.g., Metzl, supra note 6, at 724-25.
12. See Press Release, Am. Ass'n for the Advancement of Sci., Satellite Images Ob-
tained by AAAS Program Provide Strong Evidence of Zimbabwe Repression (2006),
http://www.eurekalert.orglpub-releases/2006-05/cp-sioO53006.php.
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capability to make ethical decisions regarding the appropriate use of
technology.
This Note assesses the practices of pre-implantation and prenatal
genetic screening and sex-determination through an international human
rights framework founded in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(Universal Declaration), the Convention on the Rights of the Child
(CRC), and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Dis-
crimination Against Women (CEDAW). 3 Part II of this Note looks at the
international historical backdrop of eugenics to highlight past areas of
concern with respect to eugenic theory and practice. Part III then consid-
ers modern day eugenics through the use of pre-implantation and
prenatal genetic screening for disease and for sex. Part III also explores
the issue of genetic screening and evaluates the implications for repro-
ductive choice. Part IV then specifically looks at modern day sex
selection and posits the possibility that pre-implantation genetic screen-
ing and sex-selective abortions are replacing infanticide. This section
also includes short case studies of China and India. Based on this practi-
cal review, Part V suggests that there is a need for close observation of
prenatal and pre-implantation genetic screening practices and that per-
haps more stringent and specific international guidelines should be
adopted and strictly enforced. This section further considers the possibil-
ity of banning sex-selective abortions entirely as this practice seems
incompatible with the goals of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, the CRC, and CEDAW.'4 However, it should be noted that at pre-
sent, it is unclear that the adoption and implementation of additional
13. Convention on the Rights of the Child, pmbl., Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3
[hereinafter CRC]; Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women, pmbl., Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 [hereinafter CEDAW]; Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, pmbl., U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., at 71, U.N.
Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter Universal Declaration]. It should be stressed here that
this Note assesses reproductive practices through an international human rights lens, and not
through a pro-life or reproductive rights approach.
14. While it should be noted that the idea of a human right typically presupposes the
existence of a human being, this Note does not address the question of when life actually
begins. While it may be a stretch to argue that individual human rights apply to unborn and
even un-implanted fetuses, it might still be accurate to claim that international human rights
law sets forth standards and goals for nations and for humanity. Focusing thus on the objec-
tives of such agreements, one might reasonably argue that the practice of eliminating the
possibility of the birth of a human being based on the sex of the child seems to disregard the
reasons underlying the existence of human rights law. In other words, if the objective of these
conventions is indeed to eliminate discrimination against females and to stress the inherent
equality of all humans, then allowing the perpetuation of practices, reproductive or otherwise,
that divide people into preferred classes based on sex seemingly violates the spirit of these
treaties. Breaching the essence of these agreements may have the effect of making such inter-
national law moot.
[Vol. 29:95
Fall 2007] Technological Advancement and International Human Rights 99
legislation alone will be sufficient to eradicate the larger underlying
problem of deeply entrenched, systematic sex inequality.
I. HISTORICAL CONTEXT FOR CONCERN: EUGENICS
A. Eugenics: Evolution of a Theory of Selection
Eugenic theory has been traced at least as far back as 1865, when
Francis Galton presented the idea that humans should take control over
their evolution.'5 As early as the Fifth Century, philosophers such as
Plato suggested how to deal with undesirable and imperfect offspring,
while also discussing the value of mate selection and family planning.'
6
In 1883, Galton proposed the name eugenics for this system of selective
breeding.' 7 The term eugenics is derived from the Greek word eugenes
which means "good in birth."' 8 Galton
defined eugenics broadly, as "the science of improving stock,
which is by no means confined to questions of judicious mating,
but which ... takes cognizance of all influences that tend in
however remote degree to give the more suitable races or strains
of blood a better chance of prevailing speedily over the less suit-
able than they otherwise would have had."' 9
Galton also experimented with formulations such as how social control
may impact the racial qualities of future generations, how science may
improve inborn qualities of race, and how humans may further develop
advantageous and desirable traits.20
These definitions of eugenics may not seem dangerous in light of ar-
guments for reproductive choice and autonomy. Due to the practical
contexts in which eugenics has been used, however, a negative opinion
about eugenics exists in the international community today.2' Because of
15. DANIEL J. KEVLES, IN THE NAME OF EUGENics 3 (1995); DIANE B. PAUL, CON-
TROLLING HUMAN HEREDITY: 1865 TO THE PRESENT 3 (1995).
16. PAUL, supra note 15, at 5.
17. KEVLES, supra note 15, at xii.
18. PAUL, supra note 15, at 3.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 133-34 ("We have come to identify eugenics with the most terrible parts of its
history. Eugenics evokes the image ... of [Nazi] Germany. Indeed, over every contemporary
discussion of eugenics falls the shadow of the Third Reich."); see, e.g., Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with Regard to the Application
of Biology and Medicine: Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, Apr. 4, 1997, 36
I.L.M. 817, E.T.S. No. 164, available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/
Html/I64.htm (stating that "[a]ny form of discrimination against a person on grounds of his or
her genetic heritage is prohibited") [hereinafter CHRB].
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repeated negative experiences with eugenics used as justification for
genocide and ethnic cleansing, the need arose to declare the universal
inherent worth of all human beings.2  This sentiment appears in the lan-
guage of many international conventions and agreements such as the
Universal Declaration on Human Rights, the CRC, and CEDAW, all of
which focus on the inherent "dignity and worth of the human person.,
23
While the language in these agreements does not explicitly mention
eugenics, the goal is clearly to recognize the value inherent in every per-
son, regardless of their genetic makeup or mental capacity.2
B. Eugenics in International and Transnational Contexts
Eugenics movements across the world have highlighted the dangers
of eugenics. During the decades 1890-1920, in addition to the United
Kingdom and the United States, numerous non-English-speaking coun-
tries, including, Norway, Brazil, and the Soviet Union, accepted and
advanced eugenic ideas and practices. By the late 1920s, acceptance of
eugenic theory was widespread, and many types of people were deemed
"socially inadequate," or socially parasitic, and "were recognized as the
target groups for sterilizations."26 Although many of the early eugeni-
cists, including Francis Galton, were opposed to coercion, over time
eugenics began to incorporate aspects of "coercion of people's reproduc-
22. See discussion infra Part II.B; see also GEORGE P. SMITH, II, HUMAN RIGHTS AND
BIOMEDICINE 8 (2000). Smith states,
The need for a consensus on the universality of human rights-their international
declaration, recognition, and protection-arose modernly as a consequence of the
ravages of World War II. The Axis Powers' savage trampling on human rights, the
holocausts of the gas chambers of Auschwitz and Dachau, and the use of the atom
bomb on Hiroshima galvanized an international response to universalize a legal
process for protecting human rights in the United Nations adoption in 1948 of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
Id.
23. CRC, supra note 13, pmbl.; CEDAW, supra note 13, pmbl.; Universal Declaration,
supra note 13, at 71; see also CHRB, supra note 21, pmbl. (acknowledging the "need to re-
spect the human being both as an individual and as a member of the human species ...
[clonscious that the misuse of biology and medicine may lead to acts endangering human
dignity"; and "[r]esolving to take such measures as are necessary to safeguard human dignity
and the fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual with regard to the application of
biology and medicine"); see also AURORA PLOMER, THE LAW AND ETHICS OF MEDICAL RE-
SEARCH: INTERNATIONAL BIOETHICS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 16 (2005).
24. Universal Declaration, supra note 13, art. 2; SMITH, supra note 22, at 8, 23.
25. Daniel Wikler, Can We Learn from Eugenics?, in GENETIC INFORMATION: AcQuIsI-
TION, ACCESS, AND CONTROL 1, 2 (Alison K. Thompson & Ruth F. Chadwick eds., 1999).
26. SMITH, supra note 22, at 115. Those considered to be "feebleminded," "insane,"
"criminalistic," epileptic, visually impaired or blind, hearing impaired or deaf, diseased, and
"dependents taken as orphans, ne'er-do-wells, the homeless, tramps, and paupers" were tar-
geted. Id.
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tive choices, for social ends, which may include improving the quality of
the population, preventing suffering of future generations or reducing
financial costs to the State.""
The Nazi campaign in Germany established and brought interna-
tional public attention to the dark side of eugenics." By selecting against
Jews, homosexuals, and the "hereditarily sick" the Nazis engaged in
mass extermination to achieve their eugenic goal. 9 In the scientific
community, at least briefly, "the revelations of the Holocaust had all but
buried the eugenic ideal."3° This extermination attempt, while one of the
largest in scale, does not stand alone in the crusade for a perfect popula-
tion taken to the extreme. The international community's view of
eugenics has been tainted by numerous human rights disasters such as
the Turkish slaughter of between one and two million Armenians from
1915-1923 (Armenian Holocaust),3' the Rwandan genocide in 1994,32
ethnic cleansing in Kosovo,33 and the ongoing crisis in Sudan,'M which
make the threat of mass genocide realistic. The international historical
experience with eugenics highlights the need for caution in any policy or
practice, scientific, political, or otherwise, that may have eugenic mo-
tives or goals.
Against the backdrop of the atrocities of World Wars I and II and the
Nazi experimentation with eugenics, the Universal Declaration of Hu-
man Rights was erected to create standards to protect humankind from
such "barbarous acts which have outraged the conscience of mankind."35
The Universal Declaration's repeated "guarantees of 'human dignity' ...
established eloquent reminders of the need for the advances of biotech-
nology and genetic engineering to be tied to a basic understanding of,
27. David S. King, Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis and the "New" Eugenics, 25 J.
MED. ETHICS 176, 176-77 (1999).
28. Wikler, supra note 25, at 4-5.
29. PAUL, supra note 15, at 17.
30. KEVLES, supra note 15, at 251.
31. See RICHARD G. HOVANNISIAN, THE ARMENIAN HOLOCAUST : A BIBLIOGRAPHY
RELATING TO THE DEPORTATIONS, MASSACRES, AND DISPERSION OF THE ARMENIAN PEOPLE,
1915-1923 (Armenian Heritage Press 2d. prtg. 1980); see also Robert Fisk, Remember the
First Holocaust, INDEP., Jan. 28, 2000, at 4.
32. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LEAVE NONE TO TELL THE STORY, GENOCIDE IN RWANDA
(1999), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/rwanda/ (last visited Apr. 21,2006).
33. U.S. STATE DEP'T, ETHNIC CLEANSING IN KoSovo: AN ACCOUNTING (1999),
available at http://www.state.gov/www/global/human-rightslkosovoiilhomepage.html#exe
(last visited Apr. 20, 2006).
34. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, DARFUR DESTROYED: ETHNIC CLEANSING BY GOVERN-
MENT AND MILITIA FORCES IN WESTERN SUDAN (2004), available at
http://hrw.org/reports/2004/sudan0504/sudanO504.pdf (last visited Apr. 21, 2006).
35. Universal Declaration, supra note 13; see also SHEILA MCLEAN, MODERN DILEM-
MAS: CHOOSING CHILDREN 16-17 (2006); SMITH, supra note 22, at 8.
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and respect for, fundamental human rights. 36 In light of this foundation
for human rights protection, any future activity that touches upon eugen-
ics, including genetic engineering, which "frequently does rely upon
eugenics" to combat genetic disease,37 should be examined under the
framework of the Universal Declaration and other related international
human rights documents.
III. PRESENT CONTEXT FOR CONCERN: MODERN DAY EUGENICS
A. Genetic Screening: An Overview
It would be inaccurate to classify eugenics as an occurrence of the
past. Recent advancements in nanotechnological capability, specifically
as it pertains to genetics, have allowed the threat of our eugenic past to
be carried into the present.38 First, it is important to recognize the invalu-
able contribution that the study of genetics has made to medical and
healthcare advancements. Scientists have discovered that some diseases
are genetically linked, which has allowed for improved research, diagno-
sis, and treatment of illness.39 Knowing what causes specific diseases
may also aid in future prevention. However, present discussions of treat-
ing genetic diseases lead to suggestions for avoiding undesirable
characteristics through gene therapy, which raises questions about the
potential for another eugenic crisis. °
There has been some discussion in certain social institutions about
the utility of requiring genetic testing that could indicate whether a per-
son might "develop or be a carrier of a hereditary condition"' as a pre-
requisite for entry.2 But this screening for genetic diseases creates an
avenue for discrimination by institutions such as insurance companies,
36. SMITH, supra note 22, at 23.
37. Id. at 113.
38. See, e.g., THE PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, BEYOND THERAPY: BIOTECH-
NOLOGY AND THE PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS 30-32 (2003), http://www.bioethics.gov/reports/
beyondtherapy/ [hereinafter COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS]; BRYAN APPLEYARD, BRAVE NEW
WORLDS: STAYING HUMAN IN THE GENETIC FUTURE 3-7 (1998).
39. See, e.g., J.H. GERARDS ET AL., GENETIC DISCRIMINATION AND GENETIC PRIVACY
IN A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 1 (2005); MARCUS RADETZKI ET AL., GENES AND INSUR-
ANCE: ETHICAL, LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ISSUES I (Alexander McCall Smith ed., Cambridge
University Press 2003).
40. MCLEAN, supra note 35, at 9; TROY DUSTER, BACKDOOR TO EUGENICS 5-6 (2003).
41. Maha F. Munayyer, Genetic Technology: Constructing a New Language for Inter-
national Human Rights, HUM. RTS. BRIEF, Vol. 4, No. 2 (1997), http://www.wcl.american.edu/
hrbrief/v4i2/munayy42.htm.
42. GERARDS ET AL., supra note 39, at 2-3.
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schools, and employers, 3 especially because "It]he benefits of genetic
tests that screen for incurable conditions are often evaluated in economic
terms, instead of in terms of benefits for the individuals being
screened."" It is important to note that it may be unclear what the tests
are trying to determine and what they actually mean. While the results
might indicate that a person has a genetic characteristic that might be
linked to a certain disease, that person may not actually have the condi-
tion.45 In fact, many of the people who test positive on a genetic test "will
never have a related illness, or will experience a lifetime of the asympo-
matic [sic], presymptomatic or minimally symptomatic phases of the
condition .... Genetic testing is not only a medical procedure. It is also
a way of creating social categories."'
Laws have been passed to combat such discriminatory behavior. 7 In
the context of rising healthcare premiums, however, one might envision
hefty lobbying on the part of people who lack a genetic predisposition
for specified diseases in order to keep their premiums low.4 A likely ef-
fect of such campaigning could be denial of insurance or underinsurance
to those with a genetic pre-disposition for illness.4 Further, unless strict
enforcement of anti-discrimination laws is practiced, it is conceivable
that such institutions might deny access to people with undesirable traits
and claim that the denial was grounded in some other reason unrelated to
genes or potential health.0
There are many potentially negative ramifications of considering
pre-disposition to genetic illness in determining eligibility for medical
insurance, strength as a candidate for a job, or even access to certain
43. See id. at 2; see also DUSTER, supra note 40, at 77; Munayyer, supra note 41; see
generally Marisa Anne Pagnattaro, Genetic Discrimination and the Workplace: Employee's
Right to Privacy v. Employer's Need to Know, 34 AM. Bus. L.J. 139 (2001).
44. MATTHEW ALBRIGHT, PROFITS PENDING: How LIFE PATENTS REPRESENT THE
BIGGEST SWINDLE OF THE 21ST CENTURY 95 (2004).
45. Id. at 93.
46. Id. (quoting COUNCIL FOR RESPONSIBLE GENETICS, GENETIC DISCRIMINATION (Jan.
2001), available at http://www.gene-watch.org/educational/genetic-discrimination.pdf).
47. RADETZKI ET AL., supra note 39, at 28-37; see, e.g., Convention on Human Rights
and Biomedicine, supra note 21, art. II.
48. This seems more likely to occur in a group insurance system than in an individual
private insurance scheme. See, e.g., APPLEYARD, supra note 38, at 129 (discussing potential
distortions in insurance markets); Arnold A. Dicke, The Economics of Risk Selection, in GE-
NETICS AND LIFE INSURANCE: MEDICAL UNDERWRITING AND SOCIAL POLICY 49, 63 (Mark A.
Rothstein ed., 2004) (comparing the consideration of group characteristics rather than charac-
teristics of individual members in group insurance).
49. RADETZKI ET AL., supra note 39, at 103-04.
50. Id. at 80 (discussing the reasons why existing restrictions on the access of insurance
companies to genetic information are "unlikely to be maintained").
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schools. Not only does this seem to violate a right to privacy,-" but all
three of these situations touch upon important human rights principles,
including the right to health and healthcare,52 the right to work,53 and the
right to education.4 In explicit terms, it also violates the U.N. Educa-
tional, Scientific, and Cultural Organization's (UNESCO) Universal
Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights, which prohibits
"discrimination based on genetic characteristics."55 Furthermore, the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights ensures that "[e]veryone, as a
member of society, has the right to social security and is entitled to reali-
zation ... of the economic, social and cultural rights indispensable for
his dignity and the free development of his personality."56 Arguably, de-
nying a person access to a livelihood and the benefits of healthcare and
insurance infringes upon that person's social security and thus violates
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.57
51. According to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, "[n]o one shall be sub-
jected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to
attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law
against such interference or attacks." Universal Declaration, supra note 13, art. 12.
52. Article 25(1) states,
Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-
being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical
care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of unem-
ployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in
circumstances beyond his control.
Id. art. 25(1) (emphasis added). This provision not only refers to health and healthcare, but
also seems to encompass insurance because it specifically mentions the right to security in
times of sickness and disability. Although, with the advancement of technology, at some point
in time one's genes might be within his control, as of now, they are still "circumstances be-
yond his control'"
53. Article 23(1) states, "Everyone has the right to work, to free choice of employment,
to just and favourable conditions of work and to protection against unemployment,' Id. art.
23(1).
54. Article 26(1) states, "Everyone has the right to education. Education shall be free,
at least in the elementary and fundamental stages. Elementary education shall be compulsory.
Technical and professional education shall be generally available and higher education shall
be equally accessible to all on the basis of merit." Id. art. 26(1).
55. See Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights, U.N. Educ.,
Scientific & Cultural Org. [UNESCO], UNESCO Gen. Conf. Res. 29, art. 6, UNESCO Gen.
Conf., 29th Sess., Gen. Conf. Doc. C/Res.16 (Nov. 11, 1997), available at http:/Iunesdoc.
unesco.org/images/0011/001102/110220E.pdf (adopted by the U.N. General Assembly, G.A.
Res. 53/152, U.N. GAOR, 53d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/53/152 (Mar. 10, 1999)). For further
analysis on UNESCO's role, see generally Allyn L. Taylor, Globalization and Biotechnology:
UNESCO and an International Strategy to Advance Human Rights and Public Health, 25 AM.
J.L. & MED. 479 (1999).
56. Universal Declaration, supra note 13, art. 22.
57. See, e.g., Vincent 0. Nmehielle, Genomics, Insurance, and Human Rights: Is There
a Place for Regulatory Frameworks in Africa?, 2 AFR. J. LEGAL STUD. 20, 25-26 (2006); see
generally GERARDS ET AL., supra note 39, at 47-58; see also id. at 92 (advocating for further,
more specific legislation against genetic discrimination).
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B. Genetic Testing: The Phenomenon of Designer Babies
Modem pre-implantation genetic diagnostic testing (hereinafter
PGD), which is typically used in combination with in-vitro fertilization
(IVF), tests for genetic pre-disposition to life-threatening diseases. Par-
ents are then able to select embryos that are more likely to survive
implantation and birth. PGD is already used in the United States, the
United Kingdom, Spain, and India." Many argue that this practice falls
within parents' reproductive and family planning rights. Further, the
prospect of using science to eliminate disease may, at least initially,
sound very promising. Additionally, under article 27 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, "[e]veryone has the right freely to partici-
pate in the cultural life of the community ... and to share in scientific
advancement and its benefits."6 Even if this interpretation is likely not
what the drafters of the Universal Declaration had envisioned when
drafting article 27, there seems to be room for the argument that genetic
testing simply makes use of available scientific progress.
However, one might argue that the goal of the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights was to protect both against violations of the individ-
ual's human rights and those of humanity. Where it is science itself that
perpetrates large scale human rights violations (violations against hu-
manity), perhaps the right to access such science should be questioned.
This idea is clarified in article 30 of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, which declares that "[n]othing in this Declaration may be inter-
preted as implying for any State, group or person any right to engage in
any activity or to perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the
58. U. Meister et al., Knowledge and Attitudes Toward Preimplantation Genetic Diag-
nosis in Germany, HUM. REPROD., Oct. 7, 2004, at 232. Other countries such as Germany and
Austria are much more hesitant about utilizing any reproductive mechanisms such as PGD
that may touch upon eugenics. Germany is especially sensitive as a result of its past experi-
ences with eugenics and with discrimination against disabled people. Id.
59. See, e.g., CRC, supra note 13, arts. 24(1), 24(2). The CRC provides for "family
planning education and services" to promote the "highest attainable standard of health." Simi-
larly, CEDAW seeks to ensure "the right to protection of health and to safety in working
conditions, including the safeguarding of the function of reproduction." CEDAW, supra note
13, art. I l(l)(f). CEDAW further seeks to "eliminate discrimination against women in the field
of healthcare in order to ensure, on a basis of equality of men and women, access to healthcare
services, including those related to family planning," and to "eliminate discrimination against
women in rural areas in order to ensure, on a basis of equality of men and women, that they
participate in and benefit from rural development and in particular, shall ensure to such
women the right ... to have access to adequate healthcare facilities, including information,
counseling and services in family planning." Id. arts. 12, 14(2)(b). Article 16 of CEDAW also
recognizes the same rights of men and women "to decide freely and responsibly on the num-
ber and spacing of their children and to have access to the information, education and means
to enable them to exercise these rights." Id. art. 16(l)(e).
60. Universal Declaration, supra note 13, at art. 27(1) (emphasis added).
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rights and freedoms set forth herein., 6' Arguably, the right violated is an
article 3 "right to life," 62 though admittedly, this might be a bit of a
stretch. While setting off a bomb in the middle of a civilian village dur-
ing peacetime would be a clear infringement on the article 3 "right to
life," the lines are more blurred in the case of genetic manipulation and
selective abortion.
Even in the presence of the article 27 human right to science, it is
arguable that this right is not absolute, where a person attempts to use
science to determine more than just the likelihood of survival and possi-
bility of illness of an embryo as a basis for counter-selection, but also
considers the sex of the embryo. Essentially, genetic screening allows
scientists and parents to separate traits into categories and select for
those that are desirable or better rather than those characteristics that are
more undesirable. One fear that exists is that parents could begin to use
genetic engineering to select or design virtually every aspect of their
child, from eye color and intelligence to athletic ability and even person-
ality.63 One might question the type of parent who would try to control
everything about his or her child before birth and how this parent might
react when the child develops an independent personality. 6 Further, one
might wonder about the impact on the child himself. How much of this
child's personality is really his and how much of it is determined by the
selections made by his parents? It is interesting to consider such a sce-
nario in light of article 22 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
which provides that "[e]veryone, as a member of society ... is entitled
to realization ... of the economic, social and cultural rights indispensa-
ble for his dignity and the free development of his personality," and the
similar language in the CRC which provides in its preamble "that the
child, for the full and harmonious development of his or her personality,
should grow up ... in an atmosphere of happiness, love and understand-
ing.-65
One major problem with creating "designer" babies 66 is that
[b]y making many conditions seem avoidable, genetic technol-
ogy may exaggerate the influence of genetic factors on the
development of the human personality and encourage narrow,
61. Id. art. 30 (emphasis added).
62. Id. art. 3.
63. APPLEYARD, supra note 38, at 9; COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supra note 38, at 101; see
generally MCLEAN, supra note 35, at 175.
64. But see ALLEN BUCHANAN ET AL., FROM CHANCE TO CHOICE 156 (2000) (suggest-
ing that seeking to have the "best" child is a perfectly natural instinct for parents).
65. CRC, supra note 13, pmbl.
66. Michael Seamark & James Mills, Now, the "Right" to Choose a Baby's Sex 24
Hours After the U.S. Designer Baby Storm, DAILY MAIL, Oct. 5, 2000, at 1.
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socially-determined standards of health and normality. This
viewpoint may reinforce existing prejudices against individuals
with disabilities or traits that do not satisfy the cultural ideal.6'
Reinforcing such stereotypes risks stigmatizing disabled individuals,
thereby infringing on their status as "equal ... members of the human
family."6 Further, this mentality can be dangerous because "by making
ourselves more uniform, we become even more sensitive to difference,"
which may lead to discrimination and, ultimately, attempts to eradicate
difference. 69
C. Genetic Screening: The Risk of Stigmatizing the Disabled
as a Genetically Inferior Sub-Class
With illness too, strict and inflexible standards of health and normal-
ity could create a sub-class of disabled persons.0 Looking at the genetics
of disease "creates a pressure for normality, and this pressure is intrinsi-
cally discriminatory because it amounts to a negative judgment of the
abnormal people we see around us."'7' Disability already carries with it a
certain level of stigmatization, but in a society in which people routinely
select against such characteristics and refuse to have children with dis-
abilities, those who "slip through the cracks" and are born with a
disability could be stigmatized further.7' Additionally, people who hap-
pen to acquire an injury later in life by accidental means might also be
viewed with similar disdain, thereby forcing them to the fringes of soci-
ety. Perhaps the reason that healthcare standards for the disabled have
improved over time is because a community has formed and rallied for
attention and care. 3 In a potential future society in which people with
disabilities are almost entirely eliminated, it seems unlikely that without
an interest group to rally, these few people would be treated with the
level of care and respect necessary or medically feasible. 4
The argument that incurable chronic illness carries with it a high
burden both on parents and families as well as on society may hold some
67. Munayyer, supra note 41.
68. Universal Declaration, supra note 13, pmbl.
69. APPLEYARD, supra note 38, at 138 (noting that because there exists a naturally
strong eugenic impulse, people want to have "'good' children" and thus "expect others to do
the same rather than burden society with 'bad' children"). Eventually, "those who give birth to
handicapped children that could have been aborted may come to be seen as blameworthy." Id.
70. Id. at 135-36.
71. Id. at 135.
72. Id. at 135, 138.
73. See, e.g., Alan Stockdale & Sharon F. Terry, Advocacy Groups and the New Genet-
ics, in THE DOUBLE EDGED HELIX: SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF GENETICS IN A DIVERSE
SOCIETY 80, 80-100 (Joseph S. Alperet al. eds., 2002).
74. See generally id.
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merit. However, characterizing a person as a burden not only stigmatizes
that person and her family, but also undermines the dignity of that person
and her family.75 Such an argument also ignores the philosophy of article
1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which recognizes that
"[a]ll human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights." The
CRC also establishes that
States parties shall respect the responsibilities, rights and duties
of parents or, where applicable, the members of the extended
family or community as provided for by local custom, legal
guardians or other persons legally responsible for the child, to
provide in a manner consistent with the evolving capacities of
the child, appropriate direction and guidance in the exercise by
the child of the rights recognized in the present Convention.76
With this statement, article 5 stresses the importance of respecting
parents' and relatives' roles in raising children. The language "to provide
in a manner consistent with the evolving capacities of the child" and
"appropriate direction and guidance," recognizes that the needs and ca-
pabilities of each child differ and that individualized treatment may be
necessary to serve the best interests of the child.7 Such a flexible stan-
dard serves the interest of protecting the equality and dignity of every
child and his or her family including when children are born with dis-
abilities. Under article 5, not only should handicapped children be
respected, but so should their parents.
Further, article 23 of the CRC provides that "States Parties recognize
that a mentally or physically disabled child should enjoy a full and de-
cent life, in conditions which ensure dignity, promote self reliance and
facilitate the child's active participation in the community."78 It might be
difficult to meet the standards set forth in articles 5 and 23 sufficiently
where there is social pressure not to have children with disabilities. Spe-
cifically, the "conditions which ensure dignity" standard (article 23)
would unlikely be met where conditions are such that relatives and par-
75. PAUL, supra note 15, at 133 ("Though the word 'eugenics' is scrupulously avoided
in most biomedical reports about prenatal diagnosis, except where it is strongly disclaimed as
a motive for intervention, this is disingenuous. Prenatal diagnosis presupposes that certain
fetal conditions are intrinsically not bearable"' (citing Abby Lippman, Prenatal Genetic Test-
ing and Screening: Constructing Needs and Reinforcing Inequalities, 17 AM. J.L. & MED. 15,
24--25 (1991)); see also APPLEYARD, supra note 38, at 135, 137.
76. CRC, supra note 13, art. 5 (emphasis added).
77. The text of the CRC relies on the recurrent theme that "the best interests of the
child shall be a primary consideration." See CRC, supra note 13, arts. 3, 9, 18, 20, 21, 37, 40.
Surely, the best interests of the child also involve being born into and raised in a world without
gender discrimination.
78. Id. art. 23.
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ents of the disabled person are made to feel uncomfortable for not select-
ing against having a child with disability "who will be seen as a cost to
society." If articles 5 and 23 of the CRC were truly realized, parents
would not feel pressured or face judgment for having a child with a dis-
ability because society would be respectful and supportive of their
choice.
D. Genetic Modification: A New Kind of Eugenics
Arguably, genetic engineering is a form of modem day eugenics, al-
though most geneticists and parents would probably avoid such
classification.8 Perhaps the most distinguishing feature of modem day
eugenics, as compared to historical eugenics, is that while eugenics of
the past tended to be perpetuated by a state actor, modem day eugenics
is facilitated through genetic alteration and elimination by those closest
to the individual, namely parents, relatives, doctors, employers, and in-
surers." In fact, in order to protect the goals of current human rights
treaties, States may need to take on the positive obligation of drafting
legislation and enforcing policies that will preserve a genetically unal-
tered population. It might even be important, from a human rights
perspective, to consider whether "future generations have a right to in-
herit an unmanipulated gene pool.
''8 2
While the Universal Declaration of Human Rights stresses the im-
portance of the inherent dignity of the individual, it does not specifically
mention the genetic integrity of the individual. Clearly, scientific capa-
bility in the area of genetics was not nearly as advanced at the time the
Universal Declaration was drafted but perhaps one could argue that the
idea of genetic freedom is encompassed in article 2, which entitles eve-
ryone "to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration,
without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, relig-
ion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or
other status." The recognition of equal dignity of all human beings with-
out reference to any of the aforementioned distinctions arguably implies
a respect for cultural diversity. Perhaps this could further be extended to
a parallel need for respect for genetic diversity, which would be com-
promised by genetic manipulation.
79. APPLEYARD, supra note 38, at 135.
80. PAUL, supra note 15, at 133-34. Paul further stated that "over every contemporary
discussion of eugenics falls the shadow of the Third Reich. No wonder geneticists resist the
label. To call their enterprise 'eugenics' is thereby to condemn it." Id. at 134.
81. Munayyer, supra note 41.
82. Id.
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Recognizing the importance of genetic diversity, another argument
equates what it calls "gene-ocide" 3 with genocide: "Broad application
of genetic technology is arguably comparable to genocide as defined by
the Genocide Convention. It involves the intentional destruction of the
physical integrity of a genetic group and the implementation of measures
to prevent births within that group." " One major question raised by the
options made available by genetic engineering is whether it in fact en-
hances or restricts reproductive freedom.
E. Genetic Selection: Expanding or Limiting
Reproductive Autonomy?
As history has revealed, "[p]lacing responsibility for social problems
on the traits or predispositions of certain individuals can justify policies
of discrimination or exclusion in the interest of enhancing efficiency or
maintaining social control." 85 Ultimately, the world view of genetic es-
sentialism has traditionally led to policies that restrict the reproductive
rights of individuals, for it suggests that order in a society depends on
the genetic qualities of its population and impresses upon members of
society that only those ideal traits should be continued.86 Surely ad-
vancements in medical technology have given men and women more
reproductive choice by allowing them to use family planning mecha-
nisms to decide when to have children. In fact, many of the relevant
international treaties discuss the need for family planning mechanisms
and reproductive autonomy and stress the importance of healthcare for
the mother as well as for the child.87 Technology has advanced to the
point of allowing people to not only decide when to have children but
what types of children to have. 8 At first glance, this seems to expand
greatly the reproductive options available to a woman.89 It seems to allow
her to have the child she truly wants, basing this determination on any
reasons that are important to her.90 However, one might argue that this
perceived augmentation of freedom of choice is but an illusion because it
neglects to account for the social pressures to abort or select against dis-
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. DOROTHY NELKIN & M. SUSAN LINDEE, THE DNA MYSTIQUE: THE GENE AS A
CULTURAL ICON 168 (2004).
86. Id.
87. See sources cited supra note 60.
88. MCLEAN, supra note 35, at 9.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 128; see also COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supra note 38, at 66.
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abled and otherwise undesirable fetuses and, therefore, reproductive
autonomy arguably has been restricted.9'
Some have gone so far as to suggest that the aim of genetic testing is
yet another way of controlling women's reproductive processes. 9 With
advancements in technologies such as IVF and PGD, many aspects of
procreation involve more than just the woman's choice. "[T]he number
of children that women should have, the timing of their conception, their
sex... [a]lmost everything seems to be controlled by some agency other
than women themselves. This raises the basic question of who should
have the control: scientists, religious establishments, the State, or women
themselves?" 93
In much of the developed world, prenatal tests designed to detect the
condition of the fetus are a routine aspect of prenatal care. Private insur-
ance companies have begun to cover at least some sort of prenatal
testing.94 More specifically, ultrasounds "are routinely performed regard-
less of the mother's age and provide information that she may use to
guide her care throughout pregnancy.'" 95 Other tests that may be covered
by insurance for those who can afford it,96 "such as chorionic villus sam-
pling or amniocentesis, do not influence the woman's care during
pregnancy but provide information intended to help her decide whether
to continue the pregnancy if fetal impairment is detected."97 However,
researchers have noted that some women do not find such information an
91. See, e.g., Berta Esperanza Herndndez-Truyol, Women's Rights as Human Rights-
Rules, Realities and the Role of Culture: A Formula for Reform, 21 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 605,
661 (1996); Xiaorong Li, License to Coerce: Violence Against Women, State Responsibility,
and Legal Failures in China's Family-Planning Program, 8 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 145, 188
(1996) (discussing the necessity of a shift in policy emphasis by the Chinese government to
alleviate social pressures placed on families and family planning programs).
92. SUSAN MERRILL SQUIER, BABIES IN BOTTLES: TWENTIETH CENTURY VISIONS OF
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY 100 (1994).
93. Id. (quoting R.P. Ravindra).
94. Adrienne Asch, Prenatal Diagnosis and Selective Abortion: A Challenge to Prac-
tice and Policy, in THE DOUBLE EDGED HELIX: SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF GENETICS IN A
DIVERSE SOCIETY, supra note 73, at 123, 125.
95. Id. at 124.
96. While this Note does not address the issue in great detail, it might at least be worth
noting that where healthcare is not universal and where some women have access to good
insurance plans and others do not, true reproductive freedom arguably is not universal. As
long as some women may obtain the kind of prenatal diagnosis that allows them to determine
the specific disabilities of their potential child, while those living in poverty do not have the
same access, such a policy has the potential to further divide classes and to further stigmatize
disease. One might imagine a scenario in which most, if not all, wealthy insured women were
able to abort their fetuses with disability because doctors were able to detect such disability
through amniocentesis, whereas poorer women who did not have access to such services did
not have the knowledge to make an informed choice about carrying out their pregnancy. See
generally Taylor, supra note 55, at 495.
97. Asch, supra note 94, at 124-25.
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enhancement to their ability to choose because they feel that an expecta-
tion to abort exists.98 Further, a growing number of individuals and
groups have expressed the view that "the technology is itself based on
erroneous assumptions about the adverse impact of disability on life." 99
The argument from this perspective focuses on what is communicated
about societal and familial acceptance of diversity in general and disabil-
ity in particular."' °
A major counterargument is that as long as people have the ultimate
choice of whether to have a child either in conformity with or rebellion
of societal pressures, their autonomy has not been restricted. This point,
while valid, may underestimate both the complexity of the choices that
parents-to-be presently encounter and the intensity of community pres-
sures, especially without open and frequent discussion about genetic
selection.'°'
IV. MODERN DAY EUGENICS
A. Use of Genetic Screening to Determine Child Sex: Is Pre-Birth Sex
Selection Replacing Infanticide ?102
1. Access to PGD May Be More Complicated Than
a Simple Right to Science
In some cases, parents use PGD to select against the sex of their
child when they are at risk for having children with certain sex-linked
(or X-linked) diseases such as Tay Sachs.' °3 While some new technolo-
gies have served similar aims, "they have raised to prominence the goal
of avoiding the birth of children with sex-related genetic disorders."''
98. See, e.g., Hemindez-Truyol, supra note 91, at 661.
99. Asch, supra note 99, at 125.
100. Id. (discussing the fear that people might begin to classify homosexuality as a dis-
ease that can or should be selected against).
101. See Susan Markens, Invisible Women, in THE DOUBLE EDGED HELIX: SOCIAL IM-
PLICATIONS OF GENETICS IN A DIVERSE SOCIETY, supra note 73, at 102, 102-3 (noting that
there is a lack of involvement of women in discussions regarding genetic screening even
though women are often the people affected and the ones making the ethically difficult deci-
sion, and noting a lack of discussion generally).
102. It should be noted that the terminology "pre-birth sex selection" is intended to
encompass both pre-implantation genetic engineering and sex-selective abortions.
103. G6rard Tachdjian et al., Clinical Applications of Fetal Sex Determination in Mater-
nal Blood in a Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis Centre, 17 HUM. REPROD. 2183, 2183
(2002).
104. Ethics Comm. of the Am. Soc'y of Reprod. Med., Sex Selection and Preimplanta-
tion Genetic Diagnosis, 72 FERTILITY & STERILITY 595, 595 (1999).
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The Council of Europe's Convention on Human Rights and
Biomedicine condones sex selection only where it bypasses se-
rious inherited sex-linked diseases, but not all European Union
members have adhered. In the United Kingdom, private clinics
not part of the state-owned National Health Service are permit-
ted to offer sperm sorting for sex selection. France has until now
taken a softer line with no explicit regulations concerning sex se-
lection, while Germany prohibits all forms of PGD under all
circumstances, even to prevent disease.' 05
In light of the international experience with eugenics and in the spirit
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, CEDAW, and the CRC,
the German position seems to satisfy these ideals with the greatest con-
sistency. The practice of selecting against sex to eliminate a sex-linked
disorder, while a much more internationally acceptable reason for sex
selection, still raises eugenic concerns.' The idea that some people use
pre-implantation and prenatal testing to determine, aside from health
disorders, whether the child is the "right" sex is unsettling.'07 Perhaps
more disturbing is that the sex of the child may be viewed with similar
disdain as other undesirable genetic characteristics such as disease. The
methods and motivations behind sex selection have varied throughout
history ranging from a desire to have children of the "culturally preferred
gender, to ensur[ing] the economic usefulness of offspring within a fam-
ily, to achiev[ing] gender balance among children in a given family, and
to determin[ing] a gendered birth order."" 8
105. Brendan A. Maher, Fertility Practices Meet Ethics Around the World: Preimplanta-
tion Genetic Diagnosis Lurches Forward With and Without Approval, SCIENTIST, June 21,
2004, at 25.
106. Another issue that raises some concern is the variability of interpretation and classi-
fication of a genetic defect:
Screening for a defective fetus where there is near universal consensus about the se-
riousness of the defect is one thing. When there is a high variability in the clinical
expression of a genetic disorder, a host of new issues surfaces. When there is dis-
agreement about the very nature of whether a 'defect' is a defect or an arbitrary
social assessment of aesthetics and or potential dependency, the issue then shifts
away from the advisability of medical intervention strategies for health purposes to
the question of who should decide ... the more immediate concern that already af-
fects the lives of millions of people is the development of the earliest stages of
genetic screening and its overlap with existing social groups.
DUSTER, supra note 40, at 6.
107. Martin Johnston, NSW Clinic Offers "Right" Sex Baby, N.Z. HERALD, Sept. 14-15,
2002, at A8.
108. Ethics Comm. of the Am. Soc'y of Reprod. Med., supra note 104, at 595.
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2. PGD and Infanticide: A Distinction without a Difference?
Infanticide is not a new concept. It was used by mothers in Britain as
well as in the American Colonies and in the early United States from the
sixteenth through nineteenth centuries.'09 Much earlier than that, there is
evidence that the Babylonian and Chaldean populations between 4000
and 2000 B.C. practiced infanticide." These early instances of infanti-
cide were often performed by women who were unwed and pregnant and





Historically, most of the cases of offspring selection involved male
babies selected over female infants. The foundation for this preference
took many forms:
The reasons underlying the desire for male children vary across
cultures and through time. Generally, families in patrilineal cul-
tures prefer to have at least one son, if not a predominance of
sons. This preference depends on three sets of factors that de-
termine the value of women (1) economic factors (including
values assigned to women's work, their ability to contribute to
family income or labor, and whether they have dowries), (2) so-
cial factors (particularly kinship, marriage patterns, and
religion), and (3) psychological factors. ' 3
Other conditions that are conducive to female infanticide are arranged
marriages in which "[d]owry, or wealth tribute ... accompanies the
bride,""' 4 the denial of daughters' "access to the natal family's accumu-
lated wealth,"''5  "costly or socially threatening"'' 6 circumstances
surrounding the potential marriage market,' '7 and "surfeits of unmar-
riageable males" at the lowest levels of society."8
109. See, e.g., PETER C. HOFFER & N.E.H. HULL, MURDERING MOTHERS: INFANTICIDE
IN ENGLAND AND NEW ENGLAND 1558-1803 (1981).
110. Michelle Oberman, A Brief History of Infanticide and the Law, in INFANTICIDE:
PSYCHOSOCIAL AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES ON MOTHERS WHO KILL 3, 4 (Margaret G. Spinelli
ed., 2003).
Ill. Id. at 5.
112. HOFFER & HULL, supra note 109, at 154-55.
113. VALERIE M. HUDSON & ANDREA M. DEN BOER, BARE BRANCHES: SECURITY IM-
PLICATIONS OF ASIA'S SURPLUS MALE POPULATION 29 (2004).
114. Id. at 16-18.
115. Id. at 17.
116. Id. at 18.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 18-19 (noting that as the number of unmarriageable males increases, so too
does the number of daughters who must be taken out of the marriage market).
[Vol. 29:95
Fall 2007] Technological Advancement and International Human Rights 115
Clearly under today's standards, infanticide is banned as it violates
article 3 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights "right to life" "'
and article 6 of the CRC, which states that "every child has the right to
life" 120 and requires that "State Parties shall ensure to the maximum ex-
tent possible the survival and development of the child."'' Thus, one
important question that must be examined is whether pre-implantation
and pre-birth genetic testing resulting in selection against an embryo of
a certain sex provides for, or encourages, a modern form of infanticide.
The preamble to the CRC recognizes that "the child, by reason of his
physical and mental immaturity, needs special safeguards and care, in-
cluding appropriate legal protection, before as well as after birth.' 22
Infanticide is clearly unacceptable from a human rights standpoint under
the CRC, and a positive obligation exists to protect the child. While an
arguable distinction between pre-birth extermination and post-birth ex-
termination may exist, even if pre-birth extermination is not infanticide,
practices of selective fertilization and selective abortion should warrant
serious attention if they are being utilized as a replacement mechanism
to achieve the same effect of infanticide.' 23 Even though PGD may pre-
vent more "unwanted babies from being born,"'2 where babies are
unwanted based on their sex alone, the international community and
States Parties should enforce the relevant conventions to promote adher-
ence to the principle of equality by helping to rectify the underlying
inequality that bolsters such preferences.
As CEDAW defines it,
119. Universal Declaration, supra note 13, art. 3.
120. CRC, supra note 13, art. 6(1).
121. Id. art. 6(2). It should be noted however that China has a reservation against article
6, stating, "[T]he People's Republic of China shall fulfil [sic] its obligations provided by Arti-
cle 6 of the Convention under the prerequisite that the Convention accords with the provisions
of Article 25 concerning family planning of the Constitution of the People's Republic of China
and in conformity with the provisions of the Law of Minor Children of the People's Republic
of China." CRC, Declarations and Reservations, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 (Mar. 2, 1992), available at
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/ratification/I .htm#reservations.
122. CRC, supra note 13, pmbl. The preamble to the CRC also recalls that the obligation
"to extend particular care to the child has been stated in the Geneva Declaration of the Rights
of the Child of 1924 and in the Declaration of the Rights of the Child adopted by the General
Assembly on 20 November 1959 and recognized in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (in particular in articles 23
and 24), in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (in particular
in article 10) and in the statutes and relevant instruments of specialized agencies and interna-
tional organizations concerned with the welfare of children." Id.
123. See, e.g., Editorial, Let Nature Decide, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Apr. 3, 2000, at
18 (highlighting that "[p]ushed to an extreme, sex selection techniques could be regarded as
the greatest invention ever because they can stop infanticide on the grounds of sex").
124. Id.
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the term "discrimination against women" shall mean any distinc-
tion, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which has
the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition,
enjoyment or exercise by women, irrespective of their marital
status, on a basis of equality of men and women, of human
rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, so-
cial, cultural, civil or any other field.
12
1
Excluding women from society by not permitting them to be born,
thereby denying them status as a human being, arguably constitutes dis-
crimination under this definition because at least theoretically, women
are being denied equal access to life. Thus, because women are being
restricted and ultimately excluded from entering the human race, one
might posit that while no human rights may be directly violated because
there is no human being in existence, surely the goal of international
human rights law is compromised. Thus, while PGD may not be the
equivalent of infanticide, where it violates fundamental human rights
ideals, some sort of preventive action should be taken.
3. Infanticide: A Practice of the Past?
Infanticide, particularly female infanticide, "still occurs in many
parts of Asia, particularly in south-central and eastern Asia."'12 6 In tradi-
tional patriarchal societies in which primogeniture existed, "the rules of
primogeniture exerted great pressures on women to give birth to boys,
because only males could be heirs to the family fortune. Such discrimi-
natory rules have long been discarded in most modem societies, but
remnant values favoring boys still linger."' 27 Interestingly, this preference
for male babies survives despite the fact that "[m]ales are generally more
susceptible to death in the first year of life.. . and throughout childhood
males continue to have higher mortality rates. In addition to increased
vulnerability to genetic disorders, male infants are more susceptible to
infectious diseases, particularly those of the digestive and respiratory
tracts." 
28
The United Nations Population Fund and the government of the Re-
public of Korea sponsored a symposium in 1994 at which scholars
presented papers on son preference in Asia. 29 Strong son preference was
detected in Bangladesh, China, India, Nepal, Pakistan, South Korea,
125. CEDAW, supra note 13, art. I (emphasis added).
126. HUDSON & DEN BOER, supra note 113, at 49.
127. Let Nature Decide, supra note 123.
128. HUDSON & DEN BOER, supra note 113, at 49 (footnote omitted).
129. Id. at 48.
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Taiwan, and Vietnam. ,3 Sex ratio estimates from around the world tend
to reflect the likelihood that this preference has been acted upon. As of
2003, some estimates showed a ratio of boys to girls per 100 of 108.6 in
Yugoslavia, 108.7 in Egypt, 109.7 in Hong Kong, 110 in South Korea,
110.9 in Pakistan, 117 in Delhi, India, 117 in China, 118 in Cuba, and
120 in Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia. 3 '
India and China in particular exemplify why female infanticide and
male sex selection are wholly incompatible with the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights, CEDAW, and the CRC, and should not be
permitted. Notably, "[a]s the two largest societies in the world, China
and India comprise more than 38 percent of the world's population. Be-
cause of the socially sanctioned practice of offspring sex selection, both
societies have surpluses of young adult males (ages 15-34) larger than
any that natural forces could produce." ,12 Currently, the imbalance be-
tween the number of young males and young females in China and India
arguably is larger than in any other historical period.'33
B. Case Study: Sex Selection in China
"[A] long history of female infanticide" accompanies the strong
preference for sons that is well-rooted in traditional Chinese culture.'
34
Female infanticide in China may be traced as far back as the fifth cen-
tury B.C., when a baby girl who had been abandoned was found under a
dike. 35 One major explanation for son preference is that it is correlated
to the low position of women under the traditional hierarchal Confucian
system.'36 In the twentieth century, several reforms were enacted to alter
this low position of women. The Communist Revolution of 1949, for
example, strived to attain "[e]quality, including gender equality."'37 One
such attempt at equality came through the drafting of a new marriage
law, which "attempted to abolish concubinage, dowries, female infanti-
cide, selling of children (particularly daughters), prostitution, and the
general subordination of women through patriarchal structures."'38 Even
though the communist movement "declared equality for men and
women," in effect, the impact of the revolution on the equal treatment of
130. Id.
131. COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supra note 38, at 61.
132. HUDSON & DEN BOER, supra note 113, at 4.
133. Id.
134. CHERYL L. MEYER & MICHELLE OBERMAN, ET AL., MOTHERS WHO KILL THEIR
CHILDREN: UNDERSTANDING THE ACTS OF MOMS FROM SUSAN SMITH TO THE "PROM MOM"
5-6 (2001).
135. HUDSON & DEN BOER, supra note 113, at 138.
136. MEYER & OBERMAN, supra note 134, at 5-6.
137. HUDSON & DEN BOER, supra note 113, at 148.
138. Id. at 149.
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men and women was "mixed." 139 For example, even though the Marriage
Law of 1949 gave women the right to hold and inherit property, in real-
ity, there was little recognition of the law.'40
Preference for male babies became particularly salient in 1979,
when China implemented a one-child-per-family policy, with the aim
of curbing rapid population growth. 4'Although the one-child policy did
not formally become law until 2002, the government had been enacting
the policy since 1979. 142 The Chinese government gave the rationale that
the one-child policy was necessary for "raising the quality of the people
(tigao renminde suzhi)," which at the time was substandard due to what
some characterized as overpopulation in China. 14 The official view was
that population control was the only alternative to "poverty, high infant
mortality, and malnutrition," and would therefore improve the quality of
life of the Chinese people.'" However, this belief has arguably proven to
be inaccurate, at least as it pertains to young girls, as the one-child pol-
icy has triggered a dramatic rise in the abandonment and infanticide of
baby girls.145 The implementation of the policy also correlates with an
increase in the number of abortions of female fetuses.' 6 Despite the ille-
gality of the use of ultrasound machines to determine fetal sex and the
illegality of the practice of sex selective abortion, by 1994 there were
more than 100,000 ultrasound machines in China, many of which are
believed to have aided in both of these procedures.
47
The Chinese government attempted to reduce the rate of female in-
fanticide and selective abortion by amending the underlying cultural
norms and laws thought to contribute to the preference for sons. 148 For
example, instead of placing the burden of parental care on one sex, new
laws required male and female children alike to care for their parents and
attempted to equalize inheritance rights. 149 However, it seems that "the
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 6. The original policy which began in the early 1970s was referred to as "wan,
xi, shao" ("later, farther apart, and fewer"). It was not a mandate but rather sought to encour-
age families to choose to use family planning to have fewer children. Id. at 152.
142. Id.
143. Ann Anagnost, A Surfeit of Bodies: Population and the Rationality of the State in
Post-Mao China, in CONCEIVING THE NEW WORLD ORDER: THE GLOBAL POLITICS OF RE-
PRODUCTION 22, 24, 26 (Faye D. Ginsburg & Rayna Rapp eds., 1995).
144. Li, supra note 91, at 150.
145. Id. at 166-67, 170; see also HUDSON & DEN BOER, supra note 113, at 171-73.
146. See id. at 154; Li, supra note 91, at 166-67, 169.
147. HUDSON & DEN BOER, supra note 113, at 171.
148. See id. at 174.
149. Id. at 19-20; see also id. at 249-50 (indicating further attempts by the Chinese
government to use propaganda to encourage elderly parents to rely on both sons and daughters
for care).
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customs favoring sons are so deeply entrenched that to date, these
changes have had little effect."' ° According to a 2000 census revealing
the existence of 653 million men and 612 million women in China, the
effect that one-child policy and male preference has had is overwhelm-
ing as it has resulted in 41 million "missing" females or a surplus of 41
million men.'5 ' Further,
the large number of unmarried males in China has attracted in-
terest in the press. As one journalist notes, there were 48 million
unmarried men in China in 1992 (for men of all ages above 25),
and he suggests that this number will increase easily to 80 mil-
lion in the near future if current sex ratios at birth continue.
Similarly another source suggests that China may already have
90 million bachelors.
5 2
These numbers alone may indicate that even with laws granting girls
the right to equal access to primary education and granting the right to
own land, the long-standing preference for male babies has proven to be
stronger than the government of China's newfound desire for equality.
These goals were further obstructed by the one-child policy, which, in
the long term, perhaps will be more effective than originally intended in
controlling the size of the population. Not only did the policy initially
restrict the number of children one could have, but now, it has effectively
eliminated the possibility of procreation for at least a portion of the
population due to the vast outnumbering of males to females.
C. Case Study: Sex Selection in India
Sex selection in India "is bound up with the history of the country,
its religions, the evolution of its social structure, and the changing role of
women."'53 A woman's status may vary "according to religion, position
within the social hierarchy, region, economy, and even within each fam-
ily according to birth order.""'5 Similar to the situation in China, India's
rising unbalanced sex ratio indicates that even if there are no longer "en-
tire villages without females, as in India's past, the number of females
150. ld. at 19.
151. Id. at 179; see also Judith Banister, Shortage of Girls in China Today, 21 J. PoPu-
LATION RES. 1, 2 (2004) (noting that "[dlaughters are lost primarily through sex selective
abortion, secondly through excess female infant mortality, and thirdly through neglect or mis-
treatment of girls up to age three, in cities as well as rural areas"). Banister further notes that
this "shortage of women" is not due to inaccurate or "faulty" data. Id.; see also Li, supra note
9 1, at 166-67.
152. HUDSON & DEN BOER, supra note 113, at 179-81.
153. Id. at 65.
154. Id.
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missing from the population has increased greatly as the population [has]
soared." 155
The predominant belief among social scientists evaluating female in-
fanticide and sex-selective practices is that infanticide is largely
correlated with social status. In most cultures, especially in India, prop-
erty ownership is one major factor that helps determine and assign
status. 16 In light of the continued preference for men, it might not be
shocking to learn that until the recent passage in 2005 of amendments to
the Hindu Succession Act of 1956, in some states women were not per-
mitted to own land at all.'57 While female infanticide has occurred even
in regions where women were allowed to own property, prevalence of
female infanticide is markedly higher where women could not own
property and where the greatest number of restrictions on female owner-
ship of property exists.'58 It should also be noted that in addition to
distinction based on sex, there has also traditionally been different treat-
ment under the laws "relating to marriage, divorce, adoption, and
inheritance," based on religious law and tradition which differ among
Hindus, Muslims, and Parsis.'59
In 1971, India passed the Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act
which was intended to allow abortion only in life-threatening situations
or when grave injury to the mother's physical or mental health was
likely.'6 But, only a few short years after the passage of this Act, with
the development and introduction of amniocentesis in India in 1974,
"there were early reports that the test was being used less for the detec-
tion of birth defects than for sex determination."' 6' Within two years,
more than twelve clinics had been opened all over India to "fill the very
determined requests for prenatal knowledge of the fetuses' sex."'62 A re-
port came out in the late 1980s indicating that approximately 78,000
fetuses had been aborted in India between 1978 and 1982 for what were
155. Id. at 94; see also Focus on: "Missing" Girls in Gujarat, TIMES OF INDIA, Dec. 10,
2003, available at http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/349032.cms.
156. See, e.g., L.S. VISHWANATH, FEMALE INFANTICIDE AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE: A
Socio-HISTORICAL STUDY IN WESTERN AND NORTHERN INDIA 14-16 (2000).
157. Even with the new amendments to the Hindu Succession Act of 1956, restrictions
on female ownership of property may still exist in several states in India. See, e.g., Hindu
Succession Amendment Act Comes into Force from Sept. 9, HINDUSTAN TIMES, Sept. 9, 2005;
Monsoon Proposal: Bills to Empower Women, ECON. TIMES (New Delhi), May 25, 2005;
Chirdeep Bagga, India Cabinet Opts to Further Equalise Inheritance Rights for Daughters,
TIMES OF INDIA, Dec. 17, 2004.
158. See, e.g., VISHWANATH, supra note 156, at 15.
159. Indira Jaising, Violence Against Women, the Indian Perspective, in WOMEN'S
RIGHTS, HUMAN RIGHTS 51, 52 (Julie Peters & Andrea Wolper eds., 1995).
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believed to be sex selection purposes. 163 In fact, the situation began to get
so out of hand because "[s]o many Indian physicians ... ignored the
1971 law prohibiting abortion for sex preference that the government
began a new round of hearings in the late 1980s to consider legislation to
restrict the use of new technologies for sex determination of the fetus."'"
Several Indian states including the state of Maharastra have enacted leg-
islation to ban the use of prenatal sex determination.' 65 Unfortunately,
such legislation seemingly has had little impact on the practice of sex
determination and son preference. Further, some would argue that the
passage of legislation alone is insufficient to combat this great discrimi-
nation against the female sex.'66
The introduction of new technologies in the area of reproductive and
genetic medicine has served to further complicate the issue of sex selec-
tion in India. Although PGD was intended to detect birth defects and
abnormalities, the technology has been "misused to 'eliminate' girl chil-
dren.' 67 Evidence of this trend of eliminating girl children is further
reflected in the "decline in female child sex ratio, particularly in Chen-
nai, which had come down to 906 female children for every 1,000 male
children in 2003"' 168 and in Namakkal District where, as of 2004, the sex
ratio at birth was 903 girls for every 1000 boys.' 69 Normally, the sex ratio
should be close to a 1:1 ratio with room for slight variation, so a varia-
tion of 97 females per every 100 males would be a fairly normal
occurrence.7 ° However, a ratio of 90-91 girl babies for every 100 male
babies as indicated in Chennai should raise alarm.
In response to such alarming numbers, many non-governmental or-
ganizations (NGOs) in India have banded together to form the Campaign
Against Sex Selective Abortion (CASSA) to lobby the government to
strictly enforce the Pre-Conception and Pre-Natal Diagnostic Tech-
niques Prohibition of Sex Selection Act of 2002 (PCPNDT) in letter and
in spirit.'' The group has also "demanded enforcement of ethical prac-
tices among doctors, amendment to medical code of ethics against the
backdrop of doctors promoting abortion of girl child fetuses ... and
163. Id. at 36.
164. Id. at 35-36.
165. See, e.g., id. (noting that Maharastra introduced such legislation in 1988).
166. See, e.g., Jaising, supra note 159, at 56.
167. Human Chain Against Sex Determination, HINDU, Feb. 3, 2005, available at
http:/www.hinduonnet.com/2005/02/03/stories/2005020315430300.htm.
168. Id.
169. R. Ilangovan, Sex Determination Tests Going on Unhindered in Namakkal
District, HINDU, Oct. 23, 2004, available at http://www.hinduonnet.com12004/10/24/
stories/2004102405190500.htm.
170. DUSTER, supra note 40, at 35.
171. Human Chain Against Sex Determination, supra note 167.
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ensuring that the district authorities actively implemented the PCPNDT
Act."' 2 Such action is necessary in light of the fact that many clinics and
medical staff ignore the provisions of the PCPNDT Act. 73 The great fear
of CASSA and other international NGOs is that "the sex selection and
sex selective abortion of unborn daughters [are] bound to accelerate the
downward slide of the female along the demographic ladder."
' 4
D. Lessons from Recent and Current Sex Selective Practices
The examples of recent and current practices in China and India
highlight the problem with sex selection of any kind, whether it takes
place before or after the birth of a child. Even though "sex selection
might ameliorate the situation of some individuals, it lowers the status of
women in general and only perpetuates the situation that gave rise to
it .... If we believe that sexual equality is necessary for a just society,
then we should oppose sex selection."'75 CEDAW recognizes that "a
change in the traditional role of men as well as the role of women in so-
ciety and in the family is needed to achieve full equality between men
and women.' 76 Allowing the continuation of sex selection under the
misnomer "reproductive freedom" only helps to perpetuate antiquated
and inequitable roles of men and women and to violate basic human
rights.'
7
The general understanding is that "[s]ex selection is intrinsically
wrong. Whether achieved through brutal killings or 'painless science,'
this practice is still repugnant because it reinforces gender discrimina-
tion.'' 7  Compatible with this idea, the preamble of CEDAW and the
172. Id.
173. See Sex Determination Tests Going on Unhindered in Namakkal District, supra note
169. The article notes that under Indian law,
these centres should be registered as Genetic Laboratories. But they are registered as
clinics and ultrasound centres. A hospital in Namakkal town has two scan centres at
two different places. But investigation revealed that only one of them has been regis-
tered. Another revelation is that none of the clinics is [sic] maintaining 'detailed
records' as per the Act. Very few clinics maintain records. Many clinics are not ap-
proved under the MTP Act. Yet abortions are being carried out .... A particular
hospital in the town maintains an 80 page antenatal case register with 'nil' entry:").
Id. Further, "[i]t was found that no hospital or clinic in the town submitted periodical reports
to the appropriate authority. Id.
174. Human Chain Against Sex Determination, supra note 167.
175. Asch, supra note 94, at 123 (quoting Dorothy C. Wertz & John C. Fletcher, Sex
Selection Through Parental Diagnosis: A Feminist Critique, in FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES IN
MEDICAL ETHICS 240, 242 (1992)).
176. CEDAW, supra note 13, pmbl.
177. See, e.g., Hernhndez-Truyol, supra note 91, at 653-54.
178. Let Nature Decide, supra note 123; see generally Hemndez-Truyol, supra note 91,
at 653-54.
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Universal Declaration of Human Rights reaffirm "the principle of inad-
missibility of discrimination and proclaims that all human beings are
born free and equal in dignity and rights and that everyone is entitled to
all the rights and freedoms set forth therein, without distinction of any
kind, including distinction based on sex." 9 Such discrimination cannot
be defended as harmless because it
violates the principles of equality of rights and respect for hu-
man dignity, is an obstacle to the participation of women, on
equal terms with men, in the political, social, economic and cul-
tural life of their countries, hampers the growth of the prosperity
of society and the family and makes more difficult the full de-
velopment of the potentialities of women in the service of their
countries and of humanity.'8°
Further, CEDAW requires that State Parties "take all appropriate
measures: (a) To modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of
men and women, with a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices
and customary and all other practices which are based on the idea of the
inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles
for men and women."'8' Whether the preference is based in concepts of
status, finance, or even the physical make-up of the family,'82 any prefer-
ence for a child based on sex either before or after the child is born
should be prohibited.
179. CEDAW, supra note 13, pmbl.
180. Id.
181. Id. art. 5(a). It should be noted that India has expressed a reservation to article 5(a)
declaring that the Government of the Republic of India "shall abide by and ensure these provi-
sions in conformity with its policy of non-interference in the personal affairs of any
community without its initiative and consent." Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women, Declarations, Reservations, Objections and Notifications of
Withdrawal of Reservations Relating to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women, at 14, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/SP/2006/2 (June 23,2006).
182. Although some might distinguish selecting for a child of a certain sex based on
societal preference for a child of what society deems to be a more socially and economically
utile sex, and an individual desire to have a child of a certain sex in order to balance out the
family make-up, I do not. While the motives may be indicative of systematic discrimination
versus individual discrimination, CEDAW seems to warn against any distinction or discrimi-
nation based on sex. Further, the latter example seems to mirror the former Japanese eugenic
practice of "mabiki" or "thinning." Under this practice, parents would either keep or "return" a
newborn baby depending "in part on the sex of the infant and in part on that of previous chil-
dren." HUDSON & DEN BOER, supra note 113, at 45.
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V. CONCLUSION
This Note has highlighted some of the foreseeable human rights is-
sues that may accompany scientific advancements such as genetic
screening. Ultimately, the danger does not lie in the information that is
derived from such tests, but rather in the misuse of such information. In
theory, genetic screening was intended to serve as a mechanism to ex-
pand reproductive options and autonomy. However, whether it takes the
form of community pressure or requirements by insurance and health-
care providers, genetic testing has increasingly been used to impress
limitations on reproductive freedom by projecting expectations of the
type of children people should have detailing both sex and health status.
It is not the goal of this Note to advocate for infringement on repro-
ductive autonomy of men and women. Nor is the aim to suggest
restricting the right to family planning. If anything, improving access to
family planning services and birth control methods while also expanding
universal access to sex education for men and women, may help to alle-
viate some of the pressures that force families to choose between having
a girl or boy child. By expanding availability of less technologically
complex family planning horizons, the international community and
State Parties arguably can make huge strides by providing the tools to
alleviate the underlying inequalities, many of which are related to pov-
erty in some way, that compel families to select for boy children. It
would probably be na've, however, to believe that expanding available
birth control options alone would be sufficient to combat hundreds, per-
haps thousands, of years of discrimination against women and
preference for men.
Furthering the goals of relevant international law indubitably calls
for the repeal of laws that reinforce, either in aim or in application, un-
equal treatment and rights of men and women.' 3 Laws such as those that
restrict ownership of property, access to education, choice in marriage
partner, or any other right conferred on human inhabitants anywhere
183. See, e.g., CEDAW, supra note 13, arts. 2(d), 2(e), 2(f). Article 2 states, in relevant
part,
States Parties condemn discrimination against women in all its forms, agree to pur-
sue by all appropriate means and without delay a policy of eliminating
discrimination against women and, to this end, undertake: ... (d) To refrain from
engaging in any act or practice of discrimination against women and to ensure that
public authorities and institutions shall act in conformity with this obligation; (e) To
take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women by any
person, organization or enterprise; (f) To take all appropriate measures, including
legislation, to modify or abolish existing laws, regulations, customs and practices
which constitute discrimination against women.
Id. art. 2.
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within any given country, highlight and perpetuate preference for one sex
over the other. Until men and women are equal under the laws, there is
not much hope of realizing the equality of men and women. Further-
more, laws should be applied equally. It would be futile to allow women
rights under the laws to own property, for example, when in fact, no
women were actually able to purchase or inherit property. Penalties too
should be imposed for violations of laws advancing the equality of both
sexes. Where communities refuse to enact or properly enforce such laws,
fines and perhaps even harsher punishments should be imposed.
Creating greater acceptance and appreciation for all individuals is
perhaps the most effective way to ensure respect for the dignity of every
individual. While sex selection on an individual basis may seem harm-
less, it has large-scale ramifications that impact the proper functioning
of the community, State, world and humanity. Therefore, sex selection
even on an individual basis touches more than just the reproductive
rights of a single individual or a couple of individuals but rather impacts
fundamental human rights and human advancement globally. For the
aforementioned reasons, at the present time, selection against a child of a
certain sex, for any reason, whether it pertains to cosmetics, health, so-
cial preference, or otherwise, and whether it takes place before
conception, before birth, or after birth, should not be sustained. Further-
more, because evidence indicates that recent technologies have already
been abused to select for male babies and because the potential exists for
other types of discrimination, the international community should adopt
and enforce more stringent and specified guidelines to monitor scientific
practices and to protect against future large-scale human rights viola-
tions. Because the use of genetic screening carries with it such great
potential for destruction, open discussion is also necessary among all
levels of national and international communities. However, it remains
uncertain whether such measures will be adequate to eliminate entirely
the practice of sex selection based on bias.
